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The great disgust

Thus Spoke Zarathustra

The great disgust names a crisis in Zarathustra’s response to humanity: the conviction that human smallness recurs eternally threatens to make all existence seem worthless. The phrase gathers a physical sickness, a judgment about the people who dominate the present, and a test of whether that revulsion can be overcome. Its force lies in the turn from choking despair toward a changed capacity for life, not in denying that the smallness remains.

Meaning and Repetition

The disgust begins as a reaction to the thought that the little man returns without end. Zarathustra recalls a sadness that yawns and drags its feet, unable to fall asleep, while repeating the prediction that “The man of whom you are weary, the little man, recurs eternally”. The weariness is not simply boredom with particular people: recurrence makes their diminished condition seem permanent. The repetition of “little man” gives the thought its narrowing pressure, as if the future offered no difference from the present.

The language of this passage makes that pressure bodily. The great disgust “choked me and had crept into my throat”; knowledge itself seems to choke, and the accompanying prophecy reduces existence to the conclusion, “It is all one, nothing is worth while, knowledge chokes.” Zarathustra imagines the human earth as a cave with its chest caved in, its living things transformed in his perception into decay, bones, and a mouldering past. His sighs settle on the graves of humanity and cannot rise. The image of a blocked throat thus extends into a whole world that seems unable to breathe or renew itself.

The Human Measure and Its Reversal

The vision sharpens when Zarathustra says he has seen both the greatest and the smallest human beings naked. Their apparent difference fails to offer a way out: “all too similar to one another,” even the greatest are “all too human”. His judgment, “The greatest all too small!”, overturns the expectation that exceptional stature alone could redeem humanity. The dread of recurrence applies even to the smallest; what disgusts him is therefore both the human type that persists and the prospect that existence itself must contain its return.

The emotional sequence matters. Zarathustra cries over the smallness of both wickedness and goodness, then describes disgust as choking and gives way to repeated sighs and cries of “Alas”. The repeated lament that the little man recurs turns an abstract doctrine into an ordeal of perception: everything living looks like evidence for the same weary verdict. Yet the narration also marks this as remembered sickness. When Zarathustra reaches “Disgust! Disgust! Disgust!”, his animals stop him from speaking further and urge the convalescent toward the world waiting like a garden. The contrast does not erase the remembered vision; it places a boundary around its power to define all that exists.

Disgust, Pity, and the Present

The term also names an ethical and social conflict. Zarathustra is reminded that he passed by an immodest sufferer and answered with a refusal, and that he was the first to warn against pity. The warning concerns the effect of pity on the person who suffers as well as on the one who responds: Zarathustra is described as ashamed on behalf of the great sufferer, and as teaching that a cloud can emerge from pity. The reminder then turns back upon him, cautioning him to guard against his own pity as more suffering people approach. Disgust is therefore not an uncomplicated license to recoil; it is bound to the difficult question of how to meet suffering without allowing pity to become a cloud over creation.

The social target becomes explicit in Zarathustra’s denunciation of the petty people who have become “lord and master”. Their virtues include submission, prudence, diligence, consideration, and acquiescence; their governing question is how people can preserve themselves “best, longest, most agreeably”. In this diagnosis, the great disgust is provoked not just by individual weakness but by a present whose prevailing ideals make preservation and ease the measure of human possibility. Zarathustra calls these masters the Superman’s greatest danger and urges the Higher Men to overcome their small prudences and their devotion to the happiness of the greatest number. The expression connects his revulsion at eternal recurrence to a conflict over what kind of values will shape the future.

Overcoming and the Sign of Change

A mountain sermonizer’s encounter with Zarathustra offers a counter-image to disgust. The sermonizer speaks of cows and rumination as ways of becoming free from affliction, then recognizes Zarathustra as “the overcomer of the great disgust”. The recognition gives the expression a personal and dramatic meaning: it is not only a condition Zarathustra has endured, but a condition he is understood to have surpassed. The scene’s change of attention—from the cows upon which the sermonizer gazes lovingly to the person he suddenly recognizes—makes that recognition a small reversal within the encounter.

The later sign among the Higher Men is more tentative. Zarathustra says their disgust is wavering, and treats this instability as his victory; their shame is leaving, their hearts are being unburdened, and they again enjoy good hours, rest, rumination, and gratitude. He takes their growing thankfulness as the best sign, anticipating that they will devise festivals and memorials to former joys. This ending does not claim that recurrence or human smallness has vanished. Instead, it shows a changed response: where disgust had made life look like a closed cave of decay, the Higher Men begin to recover the ability to receive and remember joy.

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